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JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY
The Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure*
JAMES J. ROBINSONt
TODAY WE ARE LAUNCHING here the prelimi-
nary draft of rules of criminal procedure for
the courts of the United States. This launch-
ing begins for this draft an experience which
the Navy would call a "shakedown" cruise, a
test cruise to be made under the sharp eyes of
an inspection and construction board made up
of the judges, lawyers and other interested
citizens of the nation. After that ordeal and
following any necessary alterations or repairs
the criminal rules under orders of the Supreme
Court will enter, we trust, upon a long career
of distinguished service to the courts and to
the people of the United States.
It is fitting that the launching should take
place here at the Judicial Conference of the
Fourth Circuit. It was here at this Conference
on June 3, 1938, that the keel of the vessel was
laid by Attorney General Cummings. Here he
advanced the proposal that the system of pro-
cedural rule-making by the Supreme Court,
begun in 1789, should now be made complete
by giving to the Supreme Court the statutory
authority to make rules for procedure prior to
and including verdict in federal criminal cases.1
It was this Circuit, moreover, which thereupon
proceeded to provide leadership, particularly
that of the Senior Circuit Judge, in advancing
the proposal toward realization. And it is this
Circuit which has provided in its Circuit Jus-
tice the commander-in-chief of the enterprise,
because it is the Chief Justice of the United
States, as you know, who under statutory direc-
tion and authority has the principal responsi-
bility in the making and in the administration
of all federal rules of court. As a final item
of proof of the appropriateness of conducting
this launching here in the Fourth Circuit it is
to be observed that the only part of the ship
which is identified with one of the federal cir-
*Address before the Judicial Conference of the Fourth
Circuit, Asheville, N. C., June 11, 1943.
tProfessor of Law and Director of the Institute of
Criminal Law Administration, Indiana University;
Reporter of the Advisory Committee of the Supreme
Court on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
cuits is the compartment known as Rule 37 (b)
(2). This rule appropriates as the method of
printing the record on appeal the plan known
as the Fourth Circuit Rule.2 Whether this
provision, or any other particular provision or
rule of this draft, will survive the "shakedown"
cruise is a matter for entry later in the ship's
log and has no bearing on the fact that it is
here in the Fourth Circuit that we are conduct-
ing the launching today.
The provisions of the rules of the Prelimi-
nary Draft are to be discussed here later by
judges, United States attorneys, practicing
lawyers and others attending the Conference.
The judges and others who are to speak and
lead the discussion on the rules have been pro-
vided with mimeographed copies of the notes
to the rules which are to be discussed by them.
All of you will receive printed copies of the
rules accompanied by the notes as soon as the
printing can be completed. It seems desirable
that I should take this opportunity to place
before you facts regarding the draft which are
not now available and which may not later be
available either in mimeographed or in printed
form for your reading and consideration, but
which nevertheless are essential as a back-
ground for discussion of the individual rules.
It is hoped that this introductory discussion
will serve also to indicate to each of you per-
sonally the essential importance of your par-
ticipation in the making of the rules and in
their revision from time to time as contem-
plated by the statutes.
I
HISTORY OF THE DRAFT
I shall place before you first the history of
the draft and the tentative schedule leading
to the proposed effective date of the rules.
The plan advanced here five years ago by the
1. Cummings, A Rounded System of Judicial Rule-
Making (1938) 24 A.B.A.J. 513; Annual Report of the
Attorney General of the United States (Cummings)(1938) 4.
2. See Dean, Fourth Circuit Rule 10 Reduces Brief
Printing Costs (1943) 26 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 148; and
(1940) 42 No. Car. Bar Assn. Rep. 71.
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Attorney General immediately attracted the
active support of the officers and members of
the American Bar Association. In the follow-
ing month at the annual meeting of the As-
sociation at Cleveland, President Vanderbilt in
the annual presidential address endorsed the
proposal. 3 A short time later President Hogan
asked the chairman of the Section of Criminal
Law to devote the year's activity of the section
as completely as possible to promoting the
enactment of the proposed legislation. The
House of Delegates at its January, 1939 meet-
ing unanimously endorsed a resolution pre-
sented by the Section recommending that Con-
gress enact the proposed statute. 4
General Cummings was then invited to serve
as chairman of the section's Committee on Su-
preme Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. He
declined but, upon request that he suggest a
chairman, he suggested Mr. Vanderbilt, who
eventually accepted. That Committee was ac-
tive in the introduction and support of a bill
presenting the proposal to the Congress. After
a hearing in May, 1939 before a Subcommittee
of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, with Honorable Zebulon
Weaver of North Carolina, the chairman of the
Subcommittee, presiding, the bill was amended
and recommended to the House of Representa-
tives for enactment. The bill continued to re-
ceive the active support of the Bar Association
committee and of Attorneys General Murphy
and Jackson, successively, and on June 29,
1940 it was signed by the President. 5
"This Act represents," said John H. Wig-
more at the time of its enactment, "the most
notable forward step, for a century past-or
more-in the rationalizing of criminal pro-
cedure in the United States."6  A memorial
service in honor of Dean Wigmore is being held
this afternoon at Northwestern University. I
believe that our Conference here at the same
time, launching the preliminary draft of the
new federal rules, is an equally appropriate
manner in which to pay tribute to his memory.
As you well know, his services in the improve-
ment of criminal law administration have ex-
tended throughout the past half century and
have not been excelled either in scope or in im-
portance. We regret deeply the fact that we
3. Vanderbilt, United We Stand (1938) 24 A.B.A.J.,
597, 600.
4. (1939) 25 A.B.A.J. 109; Hearings on H.R. 4587,
May 9, 1939, Serial No. 12, p. 31.
cannot continue to have his aid and companion-
ship in meeting the standards which he set for
the rules. He proposed as the standards for
the rules that they would be "progressive yet
not too advanced for acceptance, uniform yet
based on varied regional experience, systematic
yet not academic," and that they would display
evidence that they had been drafted and
promulgated with "harmony, courage and high
wisdom." 7
The Supreme Court pursuant to the Act of
June 29, 1940 undertook the preparation of the
rules and by order of February 3, 19418 ap-
pointed an Advisory Committee to assist the
Court in the undertaking. The Advisory Com-
mittee has held five meetings, the first in Feb-
ruary, 1941, and the latest in February, 1943.
The meetings have been held at the Supreme
Court Building except the most recent one,
which was held at the United States Court
House in New York City. The Committee's
Subcommittee on Style has held four meetings.
They were held in New York City for a total
of eight days in March and May, 1942 and in
February, 1943. The extent of the discussion
in these Advisory Committee meetings is in-
dicated by the fact that the shorthand report-
ers' transcripts of the meetings contain ap-
proximately five thousand eight hundred pages.
Seven successive drafts have now been pre-
pared by the Advisory Committee and its staff.
A new draft has been prepared following each
meeting of the Committee, incorporating the
action taken by the Committee and including
also new material for the consideration of the
Committee. Upon completion each new draft
has been delivered to each member of the Ad-
visory Committee for his use in preparing for
the next meeting of the Committee. The total
number of pages of rules and notes in the vari-
ous drafts is about two thousand.
The Committee has submitted two drafts to
the court, the first in May, 1942, and the sec-
ond in May, 1943. The May, 1942, draft was
the fourth tentative draft prepared by the
Committee. The May, 1943, draft, which you
have before you as the Preliminary Draft of
the rules, is the seventh tentative draft which
the Committee has prepared.
The May, 1942, draft and the Court's in-
5. 54 Stat. 688, U.S.C.A., Title 18, s 687 (Supp.
1942).
6. (1941) 31 J. Crim. L. 658.
7. Id. 659.
8. 312 U.S. 717 (1941).
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structions to the Advisory Committee based on
that draft marked a turning point in the policy
and plan of the Committee. Up to that time
the Committee had considered that the powers
given to it by Congress under the Act of June
29, 1940, and its authority under the orders of
the Court which had been issued to the Com-
mittee, might not justify it in preparing a
single, integrated draft, dealing not only with
procedure prior to verdict but also with appeals
and other subjects. The Committee, therefore,
had prepared the May, 1942, draft in separate
parts, the principal part relating only to pro-
cedure prior to verdict.
Congress, however, on May 9, 1942, enacted,
for the third time since the authorization of
the Committee, a statute9 giving additional
rule making power to the Court and thereby
enlarging the scope of the work in which the
Committee is engaged. The Court, likewise, in
a memorandum of views of members of the
Court based upon the May, 1942, draft, indi-
cated to the Committee that the Committee
would have authority to prepare and submit a
complete, integrated draft of rules. In view
of these actions by Congress and by the Court,
a memorandum and brief were sent by the Re-
porter to the other members of the Advisory
Committee proposing that the Committee pre-
pare a draft which would incorporate, in the
chronological procedural sequence which had
already been agreed upon by the Committee as
the sequence for the rules, the entire procedure
from arrest to and including appeal. The mem-
bers of the Committee approved this plan. The
considerations involved in this decision will
appear more clearly in a brief discussion later
of the five statutes by which Congress has
authorized the Supreme Court to make rules
governing criminal procedure.
The May, 1943, draft, the third draft pre-
pared by the Committee on its enlarged plan,
was submitted to the Court on May 3 with the
unanimous request of the Committee that the
Court authorize publication in order that the
Committee might receive the suggestions and
criticisms of the bench and bar. Publication
has now been authorized by the Court, with the
understanding that this preliminary draft rep-
resents the present recommendations but not
the final report of the Committee, and with the
9. 56 Stat. 271, U.S.C.A., Title 18, S 682 (Supp.
1942).
understanding also that the Court has not yet
proceeded to a consideration of the draft on
its merits.
The present activities of the Advisory Com-
mittee and its tentative plans may be stated
briefly. The Preliminary Draft is now in
process of preparation for printing and dis-
tribution. Approximately 38,000 copies are to
be distributed. Preparations are being made
by the Committee for receiving and studying
the recommendations and criticisms which it
is hoped that the Draft will call forth from the
bench and bar. Plans are being developed for
securing the widest possible discussion of the
rules and the greatest possible volume of com-
ments, recommendations and criticisms. Dis-
cussion at the annual meeting of the American
Bar Association is being planned for August
24th under the joint auspices of the Section of
Judicial Administration, the Committee on the
Improvement of the Administration of Justice,
the Section of Criminal Law, and the National
Conference of Judicial Councils.
The Committee has received in the past and
is counting on continuing to receive extensive
and useful recommendations from the Judicial
Conferences. Other valuable sources upon
which the Committee relies for recommenda-
tions include the special committees appointed
by the various federal courts, by the Attorney
General, by other officials and departments of
the national and state governments, and by
state and city bar associations. Serving on
these special rules committees are more than
600 judges and lawyers.
A revision of the Preliminary Draft based
on the recommendations received from the
bench and the bar with respect to the Rules of
the Preliminary Draft will be prepared for the
consideration of the Advisory Committee at its
next meeting, to be held possibly in October.
After that meeting the Committee may submit
to the Court a proposed final draft. The Court
may then givb the Committee recommendations
for further revision by the Committee and the
Court may itself of course make revisions. If
the Court should promulgate a draft of rules
before the end of this year, the Attorney Gen-
eral could then report it to Congress at the
time fixed by the Act of June 29, 1940, namely,
the beginning of a regular session. The second
regular session of the seventy-eighth Congress
will probably begin on January 3, 1944. Con-
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gress after giving the rules the same appropri-
ate consideration which it gave to the Civil
Rules may consider them as becoming effective,
as provided in Rule 55, "on the day which is
three months subsequent to the adjournment"
of the session; or perhaps a different effective
date may be adopted because of the exigencies
of the present national emergency or for other
reasons.
II
STATUTORY AND OTHER AUTHORIZATION
I wish now to place before you the authoriza-
tion of the draft, and specifically the authori-
zation for particular rules and subdivisions of
the draft.
The authorization under which the Advisory
Committee has prepared the Draft has been
derived from four acts of Congress, from three
orders of the Court and from the Court's mem-
orandum based on the. May, 1942 draft.
Rules 3 to 29 of the draft, dealing with pro-
cedure to and including verdict, have been pre-
pared under authority principally of the Act
of June 29, 194010 and of the Court's order of
February 3, 1941,11 based on that Act, provid-
ing for the making of rules governing pro-
ceedings in the district courts prior to and
including verdict.
Rules 30 and 31 dealing with judgment, and
Rules 35, 36 and 37 dealing with appeals by
defendants and by the government have been
prepared under authority of an order of No-
vember 17, 194112 in which the Court authorized
and directed the Advisory Committee to make
recommendations respecting amendments to
the appeals rules promulgated by the Court on
May 7, 1934.13 Those rules had been promul-
gated under authority of the Act of February
24, 1933, as amended by the Act of March 8,
193414 which provides for the making by the
Supreme Court of rules governing appeals by
defendants.
Rule 34 on criminal contempt has been pre-
pared under authority of the Act of November
21, 194115 which provides for the making by
the Supreme Court of rules governing criminal
10. 54 Stat. 688, U.S.C.A., Title 18, s 687 (Supp.
1942).
11. 312 U.S. 717 (1941).
12. 314 U.S. 719 (1941).
13. 292 U.S. 659 (1934), amended 301 U.S. 717
(1937), 304 U.S. 592 (1938), 311 U.S. 731 .(1940),
312 U.S. 721 (1941), 317 U.S.-(1943).
14. 48 Stat. 399, U.S.C.A., Title 18, s 688 (Supp.
1942).
contempt. The Court indicated in its memor-
andum based on the May, 1942 draft that it
desired that the Committee propose provisions
to be considered for such rules.
•Rule 13 (c) and other provisions for appeals
by the government, such as Rules 35, 36 and
37, have been prepared under authority of the
Act of May 9, 194216 and of the Court's order
of October 26, 194217 directing the Committee
to make recommendations with respect to rules
under this act.
The remainder of the rules in the Prelimi-
nary Draft are authorized under one or more
of the statutes and orders to which reference
has been made in the preceding paragraphs.
A fifth statute by which Congress has
authorized the Supreme Court to make rules
for criminal procedure is the Act of October
9, 194018 providing for the making of rules
governing the trial of petty offenses in certain
cases before United States commissioners. The
Court acting under this statute promulgated
the petty offense rules19 on January 6, 1941.
The Advisory Committee has not received an
order from the Court with respect to these
rules.
To summarize, Congress has enacted five
statutes giving to the Supreme Court the rule-
making power in criminal cases. The statutes
cover proceedings before United States com-
missioners and in the district courts, in the
circuit courts of appeals and in the Supreme
Court. Two of the statutes permit rules
promulgated by the Court to become effective
without submission to the Congress; three of
the acts require submission. Rules have been
promulgated by the Court under the two acts
not requiring submission to Congress, namely,
the criminal appeals rules act and the petty
offense rules act. The Advisory Committee has
received from the Court orders with respect
to rules under three of the acts, namely, the
act authorizing rules of procedure prior to and
including verdict, the act authorizing rules for
criminal appeals by the defendant, and the act
authorizing rules for criminal appeals by the
15. 55 Stat. 776, U.S.C.A., Title 18, s 689 (Supp.
1942).
16. 56 Stat. 271, U.S.C.A., Title 18, s 682 (Supp.
1942).
17. 317 U.S. 715 (1942).
18. 54 Stat. 1059, U.S.C.A., Title 18, s 576a (Supp.
1942).
19. 311 U.S. 733 (1941), U.S.C.A., Title 18, s 576a
(Supp. 1942).
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government. The Committee has received also
from the Court a memorandum of general di-
rection and authorization.
The petty offense rules are placed in a sup-
plement to the Preliminary Draft. The limited
type of proceedings which they cover seems to
make unnecessary at present their incorpora-
tion as an integral part of the Draft. The Ad-
visory Committee has not yet received from the
Court or from any other source an indication
that such integration would be desirable.
Integration of rules of procedure before ver-
dict with the rules of procedure after verdict
seems to be necessary. The Committee decided
following the May, 1942 draft that rules pre-
pared separately under each of these two
statutes would necessarily involve duplication,
confusion and inconvenience to bench and bar.
For example, in each set of rules provision
would need to be made of course for such mat-
ters as bail, motions, counsel for defendant,
presence of defendant, harmless error, forms,
filing and service of papers, scope and effective
date. The result would be duplication and
confusion. The Committee therefore decided,
as already stated, that it would prepare a
single, unified, self-contained draft of rules for
the conduct of all criminal proceedings in the
courts of the United States. The result is the
Preliminary Draft which is in your hands to-
day for your consideration and recommenda-
tions.
III
RULES DRAWN FROM MANY SOURCES
The sources of the provisions contained in
the draft will now be considered. Federal
criminal procedure is found as you know in
various places. The situation is indicated by
the statement of Mr. Justice Clifford in Ten-
nessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 299 (1880), that
the general statutory provision 20 for federal
criminal procedure "is a mere jumble of federal
law, common law and State law, consisting of
incongruous and irreconcilable regulations." It
is generally recognized that federal criminal
procedure, in most of its statutory and com-
mon law provisions and in its administration,
is efficient and in fact exemplary. But a search
for the present federal law with respect to de-
tails of criminal procedure requires that one
examine the federal and state constitutions and
20. Rev. Stat. s 722, U.S.C., Title 28, s 729.
statutes, the common law at various periods
in the legal history of the United States, of the
states and of England, the decisions of federal,
state and English courts, the rules of court
promulgated by the Supreme Court and by
other federal courts, and the traditional details
of practice and of administrative procedure
which are not to be found in written or printed
form. All of these sources have been consulted
and considered in the preparation of the draft.
All federal statutes dealing with criminal pro-
cedure and decisions of the federal courts on
all points with which the rules are concerned
have been read and, when advisable, abstracted
and discussed by the reporter and research as-
sistants. State statutes and decisions have
been read and similarly abstracted and dis-
cussed wherever they are pertinent because of
conformity acts, because of the absence of fed-
eral law on the subject under consideration, or
because the state provisions have offered useful
precedents or analogies. English statutes and
decisions and, less frequently, those of Scotland
have been consulted extensively. All of the
principal texts of the United States and of
England dealing with criminal procedure have
been consulted on all points of importance.
Systematic examination and appropriate appli-
cation have been made of the articles and case
annotations relating to important details of
criminal procedure which have been published
in the principal legal periodicals, particularly
in the American Bar Association Journal, in
the Journal of the American Judicature So-
ciety, and in the Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology, and in the leading law school
reviews.
The recommendations of Attorneys General
of the United States with respect to criminal
procedure, as contained in annual reports of
the Attorneys General during the past fifty
years, have been studied and used, as indicated
by the citations in the notes to the rules. The
recommendations with respect to criminal pro-
cedure which have been made by the crime
surveys, namely, the National Commission on
Law Observance and Enforcement, and the
survey of Cleveland, of Missouri, of California,
of Minnesota, of New York, of Illinois, and of
Virginia and the Report of the Attorney Gen-
eral's Conference on Crime, likewise have been
considered in the drafting of the rules and in
the preparation of the notes.
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The American Law Institute Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure, with its Commentaries, has been
regularly consulted and each of its provisions
has been examined in connection with any
relevant proposed rule. Two or three of the
proposed rules in the Preliminary Draft are
taken in part from the provisions of that Code.
Numerous other rules in the Preliminary Draft
show an indebtedness to the Code. The Com-
mentaries of the Code have been valuable as
collations of state statutes and decisions. The
direct applicability of the Code and its Com-
mentaries, however, has been reduced somewhat
by the fact that few references or citations to
federal statutes and decisions are found therein.
The Code provisions were necessarily directed
to meeting the requirements of a state code
rather than those of a federal code. The Code
nevertheless has provided invaluable assistance
in the drafting of the rules, as indicated espe-
cially by the numerous citations to the Code
in the notes to the rules.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
been used extensively in the preparation of the
Draft. In fact the first tentative draft con-
sidered by the Advisory Committee was pre-
pared on the basis of paralleling the civil rules
as closely as possible, with the purpose of dis-
covering to what extent the order and the sub-
ject.matter of each civil rule could be used or
adapted for a corresponding criminal rule. This
plan was informative and helpful in its results,
but the Advisory Committee decided that a
chronological procedural order for criminal
rules would require an arrangement different
from that followed by the civil rules. The Com-
mittee, while making all possible applications of
the civil rules, and while realizing the necessity
of coordinating the work of the two AdVisory
Committees, decided that the possibilities of
adapting the civil rules or in fact of using
any existing code of procedure as the basis or
model of organization or of content for the
criminal rules were limited and unpromising,
except in isolated instances. In short, the Com-
mittee soon realized that its task was unique
and that only very limited use or adaptation of
rules already prepared could be made.
IV
ACCEPTABILITY BASED ON EXPERIENCE AND ON
CONSTITUTIONALITY
We have now considered the history of the
Preliminary Draft, its authorization, and its
sources. We shall consider, finally, its accepta-
bility.
In discussing each rule, the question before
the Conference will be whether the rule, in its
present form, seems to be acceptable generally
to the judges, the lawyers and the other citizens
of this country. If the answer to this question
is Yes, the matter resolves itself into the effec-
tive endorsement and support of the rule. If
the answer is No, the further question is
whether the rule can be amended and should
be amended in a manner which would make it
acceptable.
The acceptability of the draft as a whole and
therefore of each rule in it, either with or with-
out amendment, seems to be determinable by
two considerations: first, that it is based on
experience, and second, that it is based on the
provisions of the Constitution of the United
States.
First, the draft is made up of provisions
which are tested by experience. Provisions of
the draft which constitute at least 85 per cent
of the total number of provisions are now the
law or practice in one or more of the 85 federal
districts or, stating it somewhat differently, in
one or more of the 11 federal judicial circuits.
Provisions of the draft which constitute about
10 per cent of the total draft are based on the
present law or practice in one or more states,
with adaptations made by the Advisory Com-
mittee when considered to be necessary or de-
sirable. Not over 5 per cent of the total num-
ber of provisions in the 56 rules of the
Preliminary Draft can be considered to be sub-
stantially new provisions. The chief charac-
teristics of the draft are intended to be simplic-
ity, clarity, conciseness and uniformity; the
draft is not intended to be characterized by a
zeal to reform present procedure or to originate
new procedure. On the contrary, the members
of the Advisory Committee have retained
wherever possible present provisions of law
which have met successfully the test of experi-
ence.
Moreover, the committee members, in pro-
posing new procedure, have tested it by their
own experience in the court room and elsewhere
in criminal law administration and by the ex-
perience of their research assistants and of the
judges and lawyers who have been supplying
the committee with suggestions and criticisms.
The members of the committee are from the
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District of Columbia and 11 states, extending
from New York and Massachusetts to Califor-
nia, and from Minnesota to New Mexico. 21 They
include lawyers, law teachers and law writers.
Their professional experience includes services
as federal and state judges, as federal and state
district attorneys, as assistant attorneys gen-
eral, as defense counsel and as lawyers in the
general practice of law. The law teachers and
law writers include an adviser in the drafting
of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the
American Law Institute and the joint author
of a standard cyclopedia of federal procedure
and practice and authors of various books and
articles in the field of criminal law and its ad-
ministration.
The research assistants of the Committee in
the office of the Reporter in the Supreme Court
Building who have had current experience in
federal criminal law administration have in-
cluded, so far as their regular official duties
would permit, Fred E. Strine of the Depart-
ment of Justice, whose services were made avail-
able by the Attorney General; Marks Alex-
ander, Assistant United States Attorney,
Springfield, Illinois, whose services were made
available by United States Attorney Howard
Doyle of the Southern District of Illinois,
President of the National Association of United
States Attorneys; and Douglas W. McGregor,
United States Attorney, Houston, Texas, chair-
man of the committee appointed by Mr. Doyle
to cooperate ,with the Advisory Committee.
Judges, other government officials and
lawyers have made their experience available
through committees appointed to assist the Ad-
visory Committee. Two committees which have
been especially convenient for calls from the
Reporter's office for assistance are the Depart-
ment of Justice committee headed by Assistant
Attorney General Wendell Berge, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia court committee of which the
chairman is United States Attorney Edward
Curran. Many of you are well aware of your
own services in making available to the Ad-
visory Committee your own experience and
judgment.
21. The members of the Advisory Committee are
Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Chairman, Newark, N. J., James
J. Robinson, Reporter, Bloomington, Ind., Alexander
Holtzoff, Secretary, Washington, D. C., George James
Burke, Ann Arbor, Mich., John J. Burns, Boston,
Mass., Frederick E. Crane, New York, N. Y., Gordon
Dean, Washington, D. C., George H. Dession, New
Haven, Conn., Sheldon Glueck, Cambridge, Mass.,
These facts help to show that the Preliminary
Draft will be in general acceptable to those who
value practical experience as a guide in the
preparation of rules of criminal procedure for
the federal courts.
Second, the draft is regarded as acceptable
because each rule is considered to be clearly
constitutional and therefore not vulnerable to
the most common objection made to almost any
proposed change in criminal procedure, namely,
unconstitutionality. It is of course a funda-
mental principle that a proposed rule of federal
criminal procedure must not infringe in the
slightest degree upon the general requirement
of due process of law or upon one or more of
the 14 specific requirements with respect to
criminal procedure set forth in the United
States Constitution. The general due process
requirement, stated in the 5th Amendment
and repeated in the 14th Amendment with
the same meaning but with different applica-
tion, provides that no person shall be deprived
of "life, liberty, or property without due proc-
ess of law." This guaranty traces its lineage,
as you know, to the 29th chapter of Magna
Carta, that document which celebrates this
month its 728th birthday. The people of the
United States, like the people of the British
Commonwealth of Nations, seem to be in no
danger of forgetting the due process clauses as
guaranties of law and liberty. Any proposed
changes in criminal procedure of course must
conform absolutely to the mandates of due proc-
ess of law.
"Due process of law," said Mr. Justice Day,
in Garland v. Washington, 232 U. S. 642, 645
(1914), "this court has held, does not require
. . . any particular form of procedure, so long
as it appears that the accused has had sufficient
notice of the accusation and an adequate oppor-
tunity to defend himself in the prosecution."
The requirements of due process for a de-
fendant in a criminal proceeding, as analyzed
by the courts, may be divided into the following
procedural guaranties: (1) Reasonable notice
of the accusation; (2) a fair hearing on the
accusation; (3) an impartial tribunal; (4) an
George A. Longsdorf, Oakland, Calif., Hugh D. Mc-
Lellan, Boston, Mass., George Z. Medalie, New York,
N. Y., Lester B. Orfield, Lincoln, Neb., Murray Sea-
songood, Cincinnati, 0., J. 0. Seth, Santa Fe, N. M.,
John B. Waite, Ann Arbor, Mich., Herbert Wechsler,
New York, N. Y., and G. Aaron Youngquist, Minne-
apolis, Minn. (312 U. S. 717; 313 U. S. 602; 314
U. S. 719.)
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orderly procedure; and, according to some cases,
(5) a conclusive judgment. Each rule is con-
sistent with these five standards of the general
constitutional guaranty of due process of law
and at the same time with the 14 specific con-
stitutional guaranties governing criminal pro-
cedure which are contained in Article 3 and in
the 4th, 5th, 6th and 8th Amendments.
Notice of the accusation, which is reasonable
notice under the established standards of the
due process clause and under the specific re-
quirements of the 4th, 5th and 6th Amend-
ments, is secured for the defendant by com-
plaint, by indictment or information, by
warrant and otherwise by the provisions of the
rules, particularly by those of Rules 3 to 11.
The provision in Rule 8 (b) that an offense
not punishable by death may be prosecuted by
information if the defendant, being represented
by counsel, waives indictment in writing has
been questioned on the ground that it violates
the specific constitutional requirement of the
5th Amendment that "no person shall be held
to answer for . . . infamous crime unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury."
The constitutionality of the provision of the
rule seems to be clearly recognized however by
competent authority. The Judicial Conference
of Senior Circuit Judges in 1941 and in 1942
recommended provision for waiver of indict-
ment.22  Attorneys general of the United
States 23 have advocated the proposal for many
years. Neither the circuit judges nor the at-
torneys general have stated that a constitu-
tional amendment would be necessary in order
to permit the waiver. In present federal law
by statutory provision 24 petty offenses may be
prosecuted upon information. Misdemeanors
for which punishment is prescribed which is
greater than that prescribed for petty offenses
but which is not infamous punishment may be
prosecuted by information instead of indict-
ment.25 The change in the present federal law
made by the provision of Rule 8 (b) is there-
fore the authorization of prosecution by infor-
mation of non-capital offenses for which in-
famous punishment is prescribed, that is, pun-
ishment by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year or by imprisonment for any term with
22. Report of the Judicial Conference of Senior
Circuit Judges (1941) 9; id. (1942) 8.
23. Annual Report of the Attorney General of the
United States (Wickersham) (1910) 77 (Waiver lim-
ited) ; id. (Mitchell) (1931) 2, (1932) 6; id. (Cum-
mings) (1933) 1, (1936) 2, (1937) 11, (1938) 9; id.
hard labor. Such non-capital offenses include
felonies and certain misdemeanors. In the case
of United States v. Gill, 55 F. (2d) 399, 404
(D.N.M. 1931), it is stated in the opinion by
Judge Phillips that waiver of indictment for
felony is permissible. The court held however
that prosecution for felony by information fol-
lowing such waiver would require legislative
authorization. Since the rule would have the
effect of a statute it would supply that authori-
zation.
The proposed rule is safeguarded by being
restricted to non-capital cases, and by the re-
quirements that the defendant have counsel and
that he make the waiver in writing. On prin-
ciple and in the absence of an express con-
stitutional mandate foreclosing waiver of in-
dictment, it seems clear that an information
is equally as effective as an indictment in giv-
ing a defendant reasonable notice of the accusa-
tion.
Hearing on the accusation, which is a fair
hearing under the established standards of the
due process clause and under the specific re-
quirements of the 5th and 6th Amendments, is
secured for the defendant by the provisions of
the rules dealing with evidence, instructions
and verdict, particularly by Rules 24 to 29, and
by the provisions which deal with pleadings
and motions, depositions and subpoenas, pre-
paratory to hearing, particularly by Rules 12
to 20.
One of the rules governing proceedings pre-
paratory to hearing, Rule 17, provides that the
attorney for the government may give the de-
fendant a precise specification of the govern-
ment's contention as to the place and time of
the offense and may thereby require the de-
fendant, if he claims to have been at another
place at that time, to specify the place at which
he claims to have been. This rule is obviously
intended to keep the trial an orderly investiga-
tion for the discovery of the truth-a fair hear-
ing for the defendant, and for the government
as well-by preventing the introduction by the
defendant of surprise evidence of alibi.
The rule has been questioned on the ground
that it violates the specific provision of the 5th
Amendment that no person "shall be compelled
(Murphy) (1939) 7.
24. U.S.C.A., Title 18, § 541 (Supp. 1942).
25. Duke v. United States, 301 U. S. 492 (1937);
Thorm v. United States, 59 F. (2d) 419 (C. C. A. 3rd,
1932), cert. denied 287 U. S. 624 (1932).
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in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." The rule, however, does not compel a
defendant to be a witness; it requires only that
if he intends to introduce voluntarily at the
trial evidence of alibi he shall give before trial
notice of that intention. The notice, like the
plea of not guilty, is not evidence; it is not
primarily concerned with establishing the
actual guilt or the actual innocence of the de-
fendant. It is concerned primarily with the
time at which the defendant shall make known
his intention to present evidence of alibi, name-
ly, before rather than after the trial begins.
When the defendant, under present practice,
presents at the trial surprise evidence of alibi
he has no constitutional privilege which would
prevent the court from ordering a recess of the
trial in order to permit the government to in-
vestigate this evidence which raises in effect a
new issue rather than directly denying the gov-
ernment's evidence. On what grounds can it
be said that the defendant nevertheless has a
constitutional privilege to refuse to give a
notice before trial which would serve to avoid
such a recess by enabling the go'ernment to
make the same investigation before the trial?
Moreover, even if the defendant in giving the
notice were considered to be a witness giving
evidence, he would not necessarily be "a witness
against himself"; he would be more likely a
witness in favor of himself. If the notice is
based on truth, the charge against the defen-
dant will very likely be dismissed immediately
and without trial. If the notice is based on
honest mistake, it will still be a benefit to the
defendant to have the government's specifica-
tion of time and place as provided by the rule,
which should assist him to discover the mistake
before it would be discovered at the trial-at
which time such a discovery is usually fatal to
any defendant. If the notice is not based on
truth or on honest mistake, can it be said that
the defendant cannot be required to give notice
because he would thereby give evidence prej-
udicial to himself that he intends to commit or
26. Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) s 44-1031 (enacted
1940); Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1942) ss 9-1631,
9-1632, 9-1633 (enacted 1935) ; Iowa Acts 1941, c. 314;
Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1935) s 62-1341 (en-
acted 1935) ; Mich. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1942) s 28.1043(enacted 1927); Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp. 1940) s
10681-1 (enacted 1935); N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937) tit.
2, c. 190, ss 7, 8 (enacted 1934) ; N. Y. Code Crim.
Proc. s 295-1 (enacted 1935) ; Ohio Code Ann. (Page,
1939), s 13444-20 (enacted 1929) ; Okla. Stat. (1941)
tit. 22, s 585 (enacted 1935) ; S.D. Code (1939) c.
to suborn perjury at the trial? The constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination pro-
tects a defendant against disclosing evidence
of a crime which he has committed; it does not
protect him against giving evidence, in com-
plying with a procedural statute or rule such
as the alibi notice rule, that he intends to com-
mit a crime in the future.
It seems clear therefore that Rule 17 does
not violate the 5th Amendment by compelling a
defendant to be a witness against himself, first,
because it does not compel him to be a witness
or to give evidence at all, and second, because
even if it be assumed that the rule compels him
to give evidence it does not compel him to give
evidence against himself.
Statutes or rules of court requiring a defen-
dant to give notice of alibi are in effect in 14
states. 26 The constitutionality of the provisions
has been sustained 27 by each of the courts,-in
New York and in Ohio,-in which the issue of
constitutionality has been decided in reported
opinions. Attorneys General 28 of the United
States and many federal judges have recom-
mended such a provision for federal procedure.
United States attorneys who voted in a poll
conducted by a committee of the National Asso-
ciation of United States Attorneys voted 2 to 1
in favor of placing in these rules an alibi notice
provision and they contributed a list of federal
criminal cases in which there have been ob-
structions or failures of justice because of the
lack of such a provision in federal criminal
procedure.
It seems clear that the constitutional require-
ment of a fair hearing for the defendant is not
violated by Rule 17 or by its companion rules
which likewise would contribute to careful
preparation for the trial instead of leaving
everything to be dealt with during the actual
trial period.
A tribunal which is an impartial tribunal
according to the established standards of the
due process clause and under the specific pro-
visions of Article 3 and of the 6th Amendment
34.28, s 34-2801 (enacted 1935, and Supreme Court Rule
of 1939) ; Utah Code Ann. (1942) s 105-22-17 (en-
acted 1935); Vt. Acts 1935, No. 51, as amended Vt
Acts 1939, No. 53; Wis. Stat. (1941) s 355.085 (Su-
preme Court Order, 214 Wis. vii, 1935).
27. People v. Schade, 161 Misc. 212 (N. Y. 1936);
State v. Smetana, 131 Ohio St. 329 (1936).
28. Annual Report of the Attorney General of the
United States (Cummings) (1933) 1, (1936) 2, (1937)
11, (1938) 9; id. (Murphy) (1939) 7.
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for trial by jury is secured for the defendant
so far as procedural provisions are concerned
by the rules for trial by jury or by the court,
particularly by Rules 21 to 23, and by the pro-
vision for transfer of the proceeding on account
of prejudice, as provided in Rule 40 (c) (2).
The provisions for waiver of privileges in
connection with trial by jury might have been
subject to challenge before the decision of Pat-
ton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276 (1930), but
they are now considered to be clearly consti-
tutional. In Rule 21, Subdivision (a) pro-
vision is made for waiver of jury trial by the
defendant, and in Subdivision (b) it is pro-
vided that he may consent that the jury consist
of less thafl 12 members. In Rule 29 (a) pro-
vision is made that the defendant may consent
that the verdict be returned by a stipulated
majority of the jurors. By each of these three
subdivisions the waiver is-to be permitted only
with the approval of the court. In Patton v.
United States the Circuit Court of Appeals of
the Eighth Circuit certified to the Supreme
Court of the United States the following ques-
tion: "After the commencement of a trial in a
Federal court before a jury of twelve men upon
an indictment charging a crime, punishment
for which may involve a penitentiary sentence, if
one juror becomes incapacitated and unable to
further proceed with his work as a juror, can
defendant or defendants and the government,
through its official representative in charge of
the case, consent to the trial proceeding to a
finality with eleven jurors, and can defendant
or defendants thus waive the right to a trial
and verdict by a constitutional jury of twelve
men?" In supporting the affirmative answer
of the Supreme Court Mr. Justice Sutherland
said, supra at 308: "It is not denied that a jury
trial may be waived in the case of petty of-
fenses, but the contention is that the rule is
otherwise in the case of crimes of the magni-
tude of the one here under consideration . . .
We are unable to find in the decisions any con-
vincing ground for holding that a waiver is
effective in misdemeanor cases but not effective
in the case of felonies."
The decision of the Supreme Court in Patton
v. United States, supra, is regarded as support-
ing these provisions of Rules 21 and 29.
Procedure which is orderly, and not irregular
and arbitrary, as measured by the established
standards of the due process clause and by the
specific requirements of the 4th and 8th Amend-
ments, is secured for the defendant by the pro-
visions of the rules considered either as a whole
or separately. A simple, definite, comprehen-
sive and integrated system of federal criminal
procedure is provided by the draft as a whole.
Specific rules in which the constitutional right
of a defendant to orderly procedure is par-
ticularly safeguarded are, for example, Rule 33
governing search and seizure, and Rule 34 deal-
ing with criminal contempt.
A judgment which is a conclusive legal judg-
ment according to established standards of the
due process clause, and which would protect the
defendant under the specific requirement of the
5th Amendment forbidding double jeopardy, is
secured for the defendant by the provisions for
judgment in Rules 30 and 31 and for appeal in
Rules 35 to 37. The provisions of the rules in
this classification, like those in the four pre-
ceding types of procedural guaranties, are con-
sidered to be consistent with each of the con-
stitutional safeguards under due process of law
and under the specific guaranties of the amend-
ments constituting the federal Bill of Rights.
The Preliminary Draft has now been consid-
ered from four principal viewpoints, namely, its
history, its authorization, its sources and its
acceptability. The transcendent consideration
is the acceptability of the Draft to the judges,
lawyers, and other citizens of the United States.
That question is to be determined by all of the
foregoing considerations, namely, the history of
the draft, from its beginning here five years ago
through its successive stages of development;
its authorization by acts of the Congress and by
orders of the Supreme Court; its sources, in
constitution, statute, and common law, in court
rules, crime surveys and procedural codes; and
finally, the fact that it is based upon experience
and upon strict conformity to the provisions of
the Constitution of the United States for the
protection of the rights and liberties of the in-
dividual.
Looking to the future, the successful accept-
ance and operation of federal rules of criminal
procedure as finally promulgated seems assured.
The probability of success for the criminal rules
is indicated by the success of all of the federal
procedural rules which heretofore have been
promulgated by the Supreme Court. They in-
clude the admiralty rules, the equity rules, the
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